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Lowery: Page v. Lexington County School District One
PAGE V. LEXINGTON COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT ONE

In Page v. Lexington County School District One,1 the United States Court

of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held Lexington County School District One's
(School District) dissemination of politically charged messages intended to
defeat pending legislation in the South Carolina General Assembly through
2
emails, links on its web site, and various other media was government speech.
The theory that "the Government's own speech.., is exempt from First
Amendment scrutiny" 3 is a relatively recent development in American
jurisprudence.4 The government may express support for policies and initiatives
that further its own interests without the agreement of all its constituents. 5 As the
theory goes, "Government must speak if it is to govern .... 'This is particularly
true in representative democracies, where governments' speech must consist not
just of information but also of explanation, persuasion, and justification to a
polity tethered to the policies and preferences acted upon by its
representatives.'

6

As such, the government is entitled to take "legitimate and appropriate steps
to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor distorted." However, the
government is not permitted to regulate private expression based on the
speaker's viewpoint without running afoul of the First Amendment. 8 Although
the First Amendment protects the private speech of all individuals regardless of
viewpoint, 9 in the case of speech funded by a compelled subsidy, "[c]itizens may
challenge compelled support of private speech, but they have no First
Amendment right not to fund government speech."10 Thus, ascertaining whether

1. 531 F.3d 275 (4th Cir. 2008).
2.
Id. at 288.
3.
Id. at 280 (quoting Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
4. See, e.g., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm'r of the Va. Dep't of Motor
Vehicles, 305 F.3d 241, 245 (4th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (Luttig, J., concurring) ("[T]he 'government
speech' doctrine is still in its formative stages, and, as yet, it is neither extensively nor finely
developed.").
5.
See Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000).
6.
Helen Norton, Government Workers and Government Speech, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV.
75, 76-77 (2008) (quoting Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of
Government Speech, 86 IOWA L. REv. 1377, 1380 (2001)).
7.
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) (citing Rust
v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 198-200 (1991)).
8.
Id. at 828-29.
9.
See id. at 828 (citing Members of the City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466
U.S. 789, 804 (1984)).
10. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 562 (2005). Despite the broad holding
in Johanns, a federal district court in Indiana recently held that the government speech doctrine did
not protect the government's speech "in retaliation to a citizen's exercise of his First Amendment
rights." Foxworthy v. Buetow, 492 F. Supp. 2d 974, 986 (S.D. Ind. 2007). The general consensus
among courts and commentators is that the government's right to speak does not rise to the level of
a First Amendment right. See Norton, supra note 6, at 78. But see David Fagundes, State Actors as
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speech is private speech or government speech is a critical
11 inquiry as a court
determines whether and how to apply the First Amendment.
As the Fourth Circuit illustrated in the Page case, when determining whether
to categorize speech as the government's own speech, courts focus on the
ownership and control the government exercises over the message and consider
several factors including the purpose of the speech, the government's editorial
control, the actual speaker, and the person or entity who bears the ultimate
responsibility for the speech's content. The government speech doctrine applies
not only to messages written or broadcast exclusively by the government, but
also to speech created by third parties for the government when "the government
sets the overall message to be communicated and approves every word that is
disseminated."' 14 Thus, the government need not be the original or sole author of
the exression at issue, the "'literal speaker,"' 15 or even identify itself as the
source 6 of the challenged expression for it to be recognized as government
speech and placed beyond the constraints imposed by the First Amendment. 17
Randall Page was a supporter of the Put Parents in Charge Act (PPICA or
the Act), a legislative proposal designed to offer tax credits to parents who
homeschooled their children or who sent their children to private or parochial
schools. 18 The School District, a government entity, 19 opposed PPICA,
anticipating that the Act would redirect funding from public schools to private
and parochial schools, thus "undermining the State's 2commitment
to a free,
0
quality public education for all South Carolina children."
To campaign against passage of the PPICA, the School District disseminated
messages via its web site, email, and newsletters to students, parents, faculty,
23
22
and staff,21 calling the Act "misguided legislation," a "Voucher In Disguise,,

First Amendment Speakers, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 1637, 1640 (2006) (arguing that the government
may have limited First Amendment rights).
11. See Page v. Lexington County Sch. Dist. One, No. 3:06-249-CMC, 2007 WL 2123784, at
*5 (D.S.C. July 20, 2007), aff'd, 531 F.3d 275 (4th Cir. 2008).
12. Page, 531 F.3d at 281 (citing Planned Parenthood of S.C., Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786,
792-93 (4th Cir. 2004)). The Fourth Circuit first adopted the four-factor test for government speech
in Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm'r of the Va. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610,
618-19 (4th Cir. 2002).
13. See Johanns, 544 U.S. at 559 (quoting Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v.
Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000)).
14. Id. at 562.
15. Sons of Confederate Veterans, 288 F.3d at 618 (quoting Wells v. City & County of
Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1141 (10th Cir. 2001)).
16. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 564 n.7.
17. The government's speech could nevertheless be constrained by other constitutional
principles, such as the Establishment Clause. See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 129
S. Ct. 1125, 1132 (2009) (stating that the Establishment Clause is a limitation on government
speech).
18. See Page v. Lexington County Sch. Dist. One, 531 F.3d 275, 277 (4th Cir. 2008).
19. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-17-10 (2004).
20. Page, 531 F.3d at 282.
21. Id.at 279-80.
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and a "Clear Abandonment of Our Public Schools With No Accountability. ' 24 A
Lexington Elementary School memo stated that "PUTTING PARENTS IN
CHARGE (aka Education Abandonment Act) is a potentially dangerous piece of
legislation;"25 the School District sent emails stating that proposed changes to
the PPICA "ma[de] a bad bill worse ''26 and urged recipients to call a radio show
at a specific date and time and join other opponents
of the bill at the South
27
Carolina State House to speak with elected officials.
When Page discovered the School District had included information
opposing the PPICA on its web site and had distributed materials criticizing the
proposed legislation, he requested from the district superintendent the
opportunity to disseminate pro-PPICA materials via the same communication
vehicles-the district's web site, email, and newsletters-that the district had
used to disseminate the anti-PPICA material. 28 The superintendent denied Page's
request, and Page filed suit alleging that the School District's refusal to allow
him access to its media represented a viewpoint-based denial of his right to free
speech.29 Page claimed the School District's inclusion of nongovernment
materials on its web site, email system, and Parent-Teacher-Student Association
(PTSA) newsletter created public fora for discussion of the PPICA and that the
First Amendment prohibited the School District from denying Page access to the
fora because of his viewpoint. 30 Specifically, Page contended the School District
did not maintain sufficient control over its channels of communication to render
the communication government speech and that only greater control
of the
31
speech would have entitled the district to deny Page access to its media.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the School District
and concluded the information on its web site and email system was government
speech not subject to forum analysis. 32 The district court concluded that although
the School District was not the speaker in the PTSA newsletter, which precluded

22. Amended Complaint, Exhibit C, Page v. Lexington County Sch. Dist. One, No. 3:06-cv00249-CMC (D.S.C. 2007), affd, 531 F.3d 275 (4th Cir. 2008).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at Exhibit D.
26. Id. at Exhibit F.
27. Id. at Exhibit G. The email stated a meeting time and place and instructed people arriving
late to join the group "in the lobby of the State House." Id. This email also included an attachment
insinuating that implementation of a voucher program in Florida resulted in a school being "accused
of physically abusing its students" and "investigat[ed] for using outdated textbooks or none at all."
Id. The email also stated that "[t]he people.., behind the funding for this risky idea are from
Michigan and Virginia and who knows where else. But if the idea is so good, then maybe they
should try it on their own children first." Id.
28. Page v. Lexington County Sch. Dist. One, 531 F.3d 275,279 (4th Cir. 2008).
29. See Complaint at 7, Page v. Lexington County Sch. Dist. One, No. 3:06-cv-00249-CMC
(D.S.C. 2007), aff'd, 531 F.3d 275 (4th Cir. 2008).
30. Page, 531 F.3dat279-80.
31. Id.at283.
32. See id. at 280.
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the court from characterizing the newsletter as government speech, the
newsletter was a limited public forum. 33 However, Page was not "within the
class of persons (or entities) for whose benefit the [PTSA] newsletter forum was
created.,34 Thus, the district
court held Page was not entitled to access any of the
35
School District's media.
Page appealed to the Fourth Circuit and argued the District Court erred by
failing to find that public fora existed and that Page was prohibited from
expression in those fora based on the School District's viewpoint
discrimination. 36 The School District maintained, as it had throughout the
litigation, that its speech was government speech and that it had no obligation
to
37
permit Page to use its system of communication to express his opinion.
Regarding the hyperlinks on the School District's web site, Page contended
the School District did not maintain the requisite control over the links sufficient
to meet the second prong of the Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association
test.38 Page argued the School District lacked control because the hyperlinked
web sites could alter their content without the School District's knowledge or
prior approval, thus precluding the School District from approving third-party
statements prior to publication. 39 As a result, third-party individuals had access
to the School District's methods of communication such that the School District
was sponsoring third-party speech without exercising ultimate control of the
speech. 4° Page argued this lack of control created a limited public forum, to
which the School District could not constitutionally deny him access solely
because of his pro-PPICA viewpoint. 41
The Fourth Circuit
applied
•
• • the Johanns
,•
•42 test to determine whether the School
District's speech on its web site and email system was government speech. The
court concluded the present case was strikingly analogous" to Johanns43 : [I]n
both situations, the government established the message; maintained control of
its content; and controlled its dissemination to the public. Moreover, in both
situations, the form of the message was, in part, adopted by the government from
private sources." 44 Consequently, the court rejected Page's argument and
specifically rejected his underlying assumption that the hyperlinks to external
third-party web sites incorporated content from those web sites into the School

33. Page v. Lexington County Sch. Dist. One, No. 3:06-cv-00249-CMC, 2007 WL 2123784,
at *8-9 (D.S.C. July 20, 2007), aff'd, 531 F.3d 275, 288 (4th Cir. 2008).
34. Id. at *9.
35. Page, 531 F.3d at 280.
36. Id.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 283.
39. Id. at 283-84.
40. Id. at 284.
41. Id.at 283.
42. Id. at 285.
43. See id. at 282.
44. Id.
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District's own web site. 45 Rather, the court found the School District had never
incorporated material from a hyperlinked web site but instead had only alerted its
visitors to other web sites with opinions on school vouchers.
The court
concluded that "nothing on the School District's website as it existed invited or
allowed private persons to publish information or their positions there so as to
create a limited public forum 47 and that the School District maintained complete
control over the hyperlinks on its web site.48 As such,
the speech was wholly
49
government speech and did not create a public forum.
Page also argued the School District created a limited public forum for
discussion of the PPICA by disseminating third-party messages via the School
District's email system50 and that the First Amendment proscribed the School
District's discrimination based on the speaker's viewpoint. 51 The Fourth Circuit
rejected Page's claim that the School District created a forum, reasoning the
School District had distributed the information only after it had read and agreed
with the information's content. 52 Further, the School District did not disseminate
information at the request of third parties, and onl the School District's
employees and officials had access to the email system.

45. Id. at 284.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 284-85.
49. Id. at 284. The court did, however, note that the situation might be different "[h]ad a
linked website somehow transformed the School District's website into a type of 'chat room' or
'bulletin board' in which private viewers could express opinions or post information." Id.
Notably, several courts have upheld challenges to government involvement in political activity
on the basis of a state statute, rather than on the First Amendment. See Kidwell v. City of Union,
462 F.3d 620, 625 n.3 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing D.C. Common Cause v. D.C., 858 F.2d 1, 11 (D.C.
Cir. 1988)); Mountain States Legal Found. v. Denver Sch. Dist. No. 1, 459 F. Supp. 357, 361 (D.
Colo. 1978); Stanson v. Mott, 551 P.2d 1, 10 (Cal. 1976); Citizens to Protect Pub. Funds v. Bd. of
Educ., 98 A.2d 673, 677 (N.J. 1953). Although Page failed to properly plead the matter on appeal,
he raised the claim to the district court that the School District's use of its resources to oppose the
legislation violated state law. Page v. Lexington County Sch. Dist. One, No. 3:06-cv-00249-CMC,
2007 WL 162178, at *14 (D.S.C. Jan. 17, 2007), aff'd, 531 F.3d 275 (4th Cir. 2008). The district
court did not consider the question. Id.
50. Page, 531 F.3d at 285.
51. See id. In Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983),
the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment protection for freedom of expression does not
uniformly apply in every avenue of communication. See id. at 44. The availability of protection
depends on the location's particular characteristics. Id. Perry Education Ass'n presented the now
familiar tripartite forum classification system: public fora, nonpublic fora, and limited public fora.
See id. at 45-46. Public fora are those places, such as sidewalks and parks, that have traditionally
been available for speech and assembly. Id. at 45 (quoting Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515
(1939)). Limited public fora are places the government has made available for expression by
particular groups or for particular purposes. See id. at 46. The government can place reasonable
restrictions on speech expressed in both public fora and limited public fora, so long as those
restrictions do not discriminate on the basis of a speaker's viewpoint. Id.
52. See Page, 531 F.3d at 285.
53. Id.
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Lastly, Page contended that several PTSA newsletters disseminated by
individual schools created a public forum for discussion of the PPICA because
they included an article opposing school vouchers written by Dr. Jim Ray, who
was not affiliated with the School District. 54 At issue was whether the School
District, by presenting third-party messages, created a limited public forum for
discussion of the PPICA.55 The Fourth Circuit held the newsletter was not
government speech because it came from the school's Parent Teacher Student
Association, "a third-party nongovernment entity. ' 56 The court noted that "[i]t
may be true that by editorially controlling the newsletter, the individual school
may have created a limited public or nonpublic forum because the speech in the
PTSA newsletter was not the government's own speech, but speech of the
Association." 57 Despite this, the court held the School District did not
impermissibly exclude Page from any forum created
because he would not
58
otherwise have had access to the PTSA newsletter.
Although the court acknowledged that the School District's communications
amounted to "grass-roots lobbying," 59 it rejected Page's contention that
governmental advocacy on pending political matters is not protected under the
government speech doctrine. 6° The court determined that the School District
directed its campaign against the PPICA at members of the state legislature, the
campaign was subject to the accountability of the democratic process and
presented no other democratic accountability concerns that would weigh against
extending the protection of the government speech doctrine to this speech. The
court noted its conclusion was supported by the rulings of other circuit
decisions
62
that protected governmental advocacy for pending ballot measures.
The Page decision is significant because it addresses two developing areas
of law: web sites as fora and the government speech doctrine. Although the
Fourth Circuit's opinion is neither a great departure from nor a broad extension

54. Id. at 279, 285.
55. See id. at 283.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 285-86
58. See id. at 286.
59. Id. at 287.
60. See id. at 288.
61. See id. at 287-88.
62. Id. at 287 (citing Kidwell v. City of Union, 462 F.3d 620, 626 (6th Cir. 2006))
(considering whether a city's support of or opposition to various ballot referenda regarding land
annexation, water and sewer services, and tax levies was government speech); Cook v. Baca, 95 F.
Supp. 2d 1215, 1227-29 (D.N.M. 2000) (applying the government speech doctrine to the mayor's
message supporting a local ballot referendum), aff'd, 12 F. App'x 640, 641 (10th Cir. 2001) (per
curiam); Ala. Libertarian Party v. City of Birmingham, 694 F. Supp. 814, 821 (N.D. Ala. 1988)
(holding that the First Amendment does not prohibit government speech in support of ballot
initiatives).
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of existing precedent, 63 Page furthers the development-and perhaps the
debate-in both areas.
Page addressed the impact of web site technology on the creation of a public
forum creation under Johanns's control requirement. The court in Page
determined that the School District had retained so much control over the web
site that it was not a forum at all-it was merely an outlet for the government's
expression. 64 Because the School District did not post documents on its web site
at the request of third parties and only posted documents it determined
completely coincided with its established anti-PPICA message, the court found
that the speech was attributable to the government alone. 65 The determination
that the School District had maintained sufficient control of its web site-despite
hyperlinks to nongovernment web sites-was critical to the School District's
success. The court rejected Page's underlying assumption that the hyperlinked
content was incorporated into the School District's expression. 66 By simply
providing a hyperlink on its web site, the School District did not incorporate any
content from the hyperlinked web site into its own web site, rather, the hyperlink
was analogous to a citation. 67 The court noted the disclaimer on the School
District's web site, coupled with the diligent oversight of all hyperlinked
materials, protected the School District from any claim that it had created a
public forum for discussion. 68
• •
69
In United States v. American Library Ass 'n, the Supreme Court declined to
apply forum analysis to the computer terminals in public libraries on the grounds
that libraries provided Internet access to library patrons like a virtual stack of
books to promote the availability of additional information, rather than for
communicative or expressive purposes. 70 The Court ruled there was no First

63. See, e.g., Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 562 (2005) ("When, as here,
the government sets the overall message to be communicated and approves every word that is
disseminated, it is not precluded from relying on the government-speech doctrine .... ); Kidwell,
462 F.3d at 626 ("Because [the defendant's] speech in this case was germane to its role as governor,
plaintiffs have failed to show that democratic legitimacy is threatened or that [the defendant's]
compelled subsidy of its speech violates the Constitution."); Planned Parenthood of S.C., Inc. v.
Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 799 (4th Cir. 2004) (finding a violation of the First Amendment when "[t]he
State has opened a limited forum for expression, then entered that forum as a covert but dominant
speaker, advocating for one viewpoint.., without political accountability and without authorizing
the expression of the opposing viewpoint."); Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm'r of the
Va. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 618-19 (4th Cir. 2002) (relying on factors established
by sister circuits to determine the scope of the government speech doctrine); Cook, 95 F. Supp. 2d at
1226 (D.N.M. 2000) ("The city only could not have discriminated on the basis of viewpoint if the
denied message was otherwise includible in the forum's limitations, and here, because the message
came from a private group and not the mayor, the message was not otherwise includible.").
64. Page, 531 F.3d at 285.
65. See id. at 284-85.
66. Id. at 284.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. 539 U.S. 194 (2003).
70. Id. at 206-07.
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Amendment violation when libraries installed obscenity filtering software on
publicly available computers. 71 However, not every case that has considered the
First Amendment in the context of the Internet has determined that hyperlinks on
a web site would never constitute a public forum. 72 Before the district court,
Page relied on Putnam Pit, Inc. v. City of Cookeville,73 where the Sixth Circuit
reversed summary judgment in favor of the City of Cookeville, which had
refused to place a hyperlink to the plaintiff's web site on its web site. 74 The Sixth
Circuit applied traditional forum analysis to the city's web site as government
property.
The Fourth Circuit's opinion in Page did not address whether the
government speech doctrine is subject to any limitations. Although the School
District had used the email system to circulate an article by a third party author,
the court reiterated that the government need not be the literal speaker for the
speech to be government speech and applied the existing government speech
framework to the facts of Page.76 However, the existing framework has proven
less than satisfactory, particularly to some members of the Supreme Court.
Justice Souter's dissent in Johanns, joined by Justice Stevens and Justice
Kennedy, argued that courts should not classify speech as a government speech
"unless the government ... put[s] that speech forward as its own. Otherwise
there is no check whatever on government's power .... 77 Some commentators
have advocated the government speech doctrine should apply only when it is
clear the government is the speaker, 78 while others have argued "[lt]he Supreme

71. Id. at 211-12. Still, there are some who urge for the application of the public forum
analysis to web sites. See, e.g., R. Johan Conrod, Note, Linking Public Websites to the Public
Forum, 87 VA. L. REV. 1007, 1009 (2001) (advocating for courts to consider government web sites
as public fora). Other commentators offer varying solutions to the unique complications resulting
from the convergence of expanding web technology and the realm of free speech policy. See, e.g.,
Ronnie Cohen & Janine S. Hiller, Towards a Theory of Cyberplace: A Proposalfor a New Legal
Framework, 10 RICH. J.L. & TenCH. 2, 58 (2003) (suggesting a "place of public communication"
standard for web sites, which balances common law tort doctrine and free speech concerns);
Pearson Liddel, Jr. et al., This Little Piggy Stayed Home: Accessibility of Governmentally
Controlled Internet Marketplaces, 15 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TenCH. 31, 53 (2004) (positing that the
Internet should not be subject to forum analysis, but rather should be subject to "nonlegal
categories").
72. See, e.g., Putnam Pit, Inc. v. City of Cookeville, 221 F.3d 834, 842 (6th Cir. 2000)
(applying traditional forum analysis to a government web site).
73. Id. at 834.
74. Id. at 839, 846.
75. Id. at 842 (stating that the same analysis applies whether a forum is "metaphysical" or
"spatial or geographic") (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
830 (1995)).
76. Page v. Lexington County Sch. Dist. One, 531 F.3d 275, 282 (4th Cir. 2008).
77. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 571 (2005) (Souter, J., joined by
Kennedy, J., and Stevens, J., dissenting).
78. See, e.g., Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, Transparencyand Government Speech, 56 HASTINGS
L.J. 983, 988-89, 1005 (2005) (applying social science research to people's perception of
government speech and arguing that government participation should be transparent); Case
Comment, Government Speech Doctrine-Compelled Support for Agricultural Advertising, 119
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Court should consider shifting its focus from who
79 is speaking to what rights, if
any, are implicated in a particular arrangement."
The content of the messages promulgated by the School District in Page is
unsettling. While none of the statements were clearly false, some were gross
extrapolations that resembled a political pundit's script rather than an
informational pamphlet critical of the PPICA or school vouchers.8 0 The Fourth
Circuit has not yet considered whether an audience should be entitled to rely on
the veracity of the government's speech. In determining the proper limits, if any,
to impose on the government's expression, the Fourth Circuit should consider
whether the government as a speaker should be held to a higher standard of
truthfulness than individuals. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,81 the Supreme
Court declared that " [t]he constitutional protection does not turn upon the truth,
popularity, or social utility of the ideas and beliefs which are offered., 82 The
Court held that "half-truths," "misinformation, ' 83 and "defamatory content' 84 are
protected by the broad sweep of the First Amendment because protecting free
expression and open debate in the democratic process outweighs the risk of
falsehood.85 Given the magnified potential that the government as a speaker
could distort issues in the marketplace of ideas, 86 courts should carefully
consider whether to lower the tolerance for political or partisan advocacy when
the government is the speaker.
As Page demonstrates, government speech is a relatively undeveloped
doctrine in constitutional jurisprudence; constantly evolving forms of
technology, communication, and expression only increase the need for courts to
develop fully the proper framework. As the Fourth Circuit considers the proper
shape that the developing government speech doctrine should take, it should also
consider whether the government's identity as the speaker should be transparent
and whether to hold the government to a higher standard of veracity.
Blaire C. Lowery

HARV. L. REV. 277, 286 (2005) (arguing that accepting the transparency requirement suggested in
Justice Souter's dissent would prevent "feedback loops and combat entrenchment").
79. Note, The Curious Relationship Between the Compelled Speech and Government Speech
Doctrines, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2411, 2432 (2004) (arguing that the "germaneness requirement"
from the compelled speech doctrine should apply to the government speech doctrine). This Note
predated Johanns.
80. See supra text accompanying notes 21-27.
81. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
82. Id. at 271 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445 (1963)).
83. Id. at 273 (quoting Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 342, 343 n.5, 345 (1946)).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 272 (quoting Sweeney v. Patterson, 128 F.2d 457, 458 (D.C. Cir. 1942)).
86. See Lee, supra note 78, at 1004.
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